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Their unremitting diligence and constant attention to the main object of all 
their undertakings; their unquenchable thirst for wealth. (Quoted in 





  Expelled from England in 1290, Jews openly returned to London in 1656 under 
the protection of Oliver Cromwell.  The initial population numbering 160 grew to 450 by 
1680 and 850 by 1695 (Pollins: 42 and 242).  In 1720 there were probably no more than 
2,500 Jews living in London, of whom roughly 1,000 were Sephardic and 1,500 were 
Ashkenazi, relative to a London population of at least 600,000 (Endelman:41).   
Historians agree that Jews in London focused on overseas trade and brokering (Yogev: 
15; Pollins: 43).  Their connections with the trading world of Amsterdam, Portugal and 
Brazil are understandable; their role as brokers is less clear.
2  
  Over the course of the seventeenth century, a secondary market in financial stocks 
emerged in both Amsterdam and London.  While this market was stronger in Amsterdam 
early on, London was the pre-eminent market by the eighteenth century.  Thus Jewish 
brokers in Amsterdam might have wanted to be part of this growing London market. 
Brokering requires that an individual stand ready to buy or sell a share and that he or she 
be able to put one party in touch with another party.  The role of a broker is one of 
intermediary and intermediation requires information and connections.  Although the 
early eighteenth century witnessed the beginnings of the shift from personal to 
impersonal finance, this was still a world in which significant personal and business 
relationships were determined by family and kinship links, and shared religious and 
political beliefs.
3  Not only were Jews outside extant political, religious and kin circles,  
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but they were also a relatively new immigrant group.  Indeed, the quotations opening this 
paper are evocative of the long-standing prejudice towards international Jewry in the 
financial arena.  Therefore we have to ask in what sense could a member of this relatively 
new and Jewish community, one whose rights were circumscribed, act as an intermediary 
beyond its own immediate group?   
  This paper, thus, explores the role of Jewish players in the secondary market for 
shares and, more particularly, the role of brokering activities by individual members of 
London Jewry.  It specifically examines the network of relationships created by the 
buying and selling of shares in the market for Bank of England shares.  Based on the 
transfer books of the Bank of England, we have information on each of the almost 7,000 
transfers of Bank stock over the course of 1720, the year of the South Sea Bubble.   
Focusing on these transfers, we use social network analysis to measure the strength of 
brokering activity by Jews or the strength of ties between the Jewish and non-Jewish 
communities (Granovetter,1983, 2005). Beyond measuring the size of Jewish 
participation in the market, this analysis allows us to trace the actual lines of connection 
between any one trader and another; in other words through whose hands did a share pass 
into or out of the Jewish community.  Specifically, we focus on the role played by Francis 
(Aaron) Pereira, a Sephardic Jew, and Moses Hart, an Ashkenazi, both of whom were 
important financiers of the period, as well as important figures in their respective 
communities.
 4    
  Religion separated Jews from Gentiles, just as religion separated Catholic from 
Church of England, and Protestants from Dissenters.  Despite the fact that religion 
separated many groups in England, the Jewish community certainly appears more  
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disconnected.  Although the primary purpose of this paper is to understand how members 
of London Jewry were embedded in the secondary market for Bank of England stock, a 
more over arching ambition is to understand the reality of Jewish segregation in London 
at the beginning of the 18
th century.  We use these business dealings in Bank stock as a 
case study of the extent of Jewish penetration of the market, while raising, by 
implication, questions concerning connectivity between financial and other spheres in 
society. 
   We begin with a very brief history of the London Jewish Community from the 
mid seventeenth to the mid eighteenth century and then of the structure of the London 
stock market prior and during the South Sea Bubble of 1720.  This is followed by an 
overview of the structure of networks and the role played by social capital.  We then 
provide a short description of the transfer books of the Bank of England.  Using the 
information provided by the Bank ledgers, we find that there were relatively few 
members of the Jewish community buying or selling stock.  However, the percentage of 
Bank stock involved was larger than their numerical share of the market. We find that 
members of the community were selling to and buying from the larger community and 
not merely within their own group.  We also find that Francis Pereira and some other 
Jews acted as brokers and were tightly networked with the other large brokers in Bank of 
England stock.  Overall, despite the prevailing stereotypes and fears about doing business 
with London’s Jews, they were heavily involved in market transactions for Bank stock.  
Furthermore, the timing of Pereira and Hart’s involvement with the market raise 
important questions concerning the role played by Jewish financiers in sustaining the 




1.  Brief Historical Background 
  Jews were expelled from England in 1290.
5  In 1492, Ferdinand and Isabella of 
Spain expelled Spanish Jews ostensibly to prevent contact between professing Jews and 
those, known as New Christians or Conversos, who had been baptized (forcibly or 
otherwise) at the end of the fourteenth century.  Many went initially to Portugal but, in 
1497, they too were expelled.  As a result, Jews and New Christians, whether crypto Jews 
or not, moved into communities in Europe, North Africa, and the Ottoman Empire.  As 
nominal Catholics, Conversos could settle in places where Jews were excluded, such as 
London, Hamburg or the South of France.  Others settled in existing Jewish communities 
such as Venice and Livorno and yet others in cities with no policies regarding Jewish 
settlement (Goldish:235).  Thus by the end of the sixteenth century, a Sephardic 
community linked by family and commercial ties existed across Europe. 
  Encouraged by the growth in the international economy and the long-distance 
trades, and protected by the treaty of 1630 with Spain, New Christian merchants settled in 
London.
6   As Spanish merchants this group, whether crypto-Jews or not, had to appear as 
Roman Catholic, attending Mass at the various Catholic embassies in London.  In late 
1655, when war with Spain threatened Spanish merchants in London with confiscation of 
their goods and ships, some Conversos claimed refugee status as Spanish Jews (Edelman: 
26).  Two forces building over the previous decades made it feasible for Jews to think 
that they might live openly in London.  The first was theological or eschatological and 
stemmed from the growth of millarianism, especially among radical Puritans.   They  
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believed that the end of the current age was nigh but that the coming millennium was 
linked to the conversion of the Jews, which required that Jews live in England.
7 These 
beliefs were mirrored among some in the Jewish community in Amsterdam, who 
believed that for a Messiah to come, Jews had to live everywhere.  Publication of The 
Hope of Israel in England marked the start of a campaign to obtain government approval 
for Jewish resettlement in England. (Endelman:22)
8 
  Involvement in long distance trade and wars, whether domestic or foreign, 
increased connections between the English state and the international financial 
community.  Wars needed to be financed and armies supplied and here Jewish financiers, 
such as Machado and Pereira, were among the leading companies in this area.  Cromwell, 
thus, had both personal theological motives and pragmatic political economy reasons for 
the readmission of Jews to England.  In favor of readmission, Cromwell, however, sought 
wider support, by convening what has become known as the Whitehall Conference in 
December 1655.  Although that support was not forthcoming, he tacitly allowed Jews to 
live openly in London. However, the expulsion order of 1290 was not rescinded. Over the 
next four decades, especially at times of regime change, the merchant community in 
London pushed to have the Jews expelled; while the Crown continued to suppress these 
attempts.  In each case, the self-interest of the Crown lay with being able to procure the 
financial resources it needed and perhaps also to have a bargaining position.  Yet despite 
the protection afforded this community by the Crown, the protection was personal and 
potentially precarious.  The Jewish community lived in London on sufferance.  Their 
protection came from the Crown but existed only as long as the group was potentially 
useful to the Crown.
9    
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  Along with Dissenters, Catholics and others who could not take the Christological 
oaths, Jews could not be Freemen of the City of London, nor members of the livery 
guilds, nor hold public office, nor get degrees from Oxford or Cambridge.  They could 
not open retail businesses within the City limits.  Foreigners could not own property.  
And foreigners could be expelled from the country (Endelman:36).  So in this sense Jews 
were not more restricted than English Catholics.  Jews born in London were English, but 
as Jews, they were aliens and could be expelled.
10  Thus, by the first decades of the 
eighteenth century, although London’s Jewish community was probably less threatened 
than in other parts of Europe, it was still relatively new and foreign.  As such, it would 
not be connected into the existing social fabric created by circles of family, religion or 
politics.  Jews were outsiders. 
 
2.  The Stock Market and the South Sea Bubble 
Joint-stock trading companies emerged as a unique business form around the 
beginning of the seventeenth century.  These were limited liability firms in which a 
person owned a share in the company which itself was a legal entity.  The company 
acquired its capital by selling shares to the public.  Initially stock was closely held but 
over time a secondary market for shares emerged.  Such a secondary market for shares is 
a stock market in which people buy and/or sell shares for their own individual personal 
financial reasons.  By the first two decades of the eighteenth century, a well-developed 
secondary market had developed in London.
11  The market was not one physical site; 
rather transactions took place in several different locations.  A buyer or seller could go to 
the head offices of the individual companies, such as the East India company house or the  
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Bank of England building, and match up there with someone who wanted to sell or buy.   
Another venue operated in the coffee houses in Exchange Alley, such as Jonathan’s and 
Garraway’s.
12  Or if one was uncomfortable frequenting a coffee house or standing in 
front of a company house, one could use a known jobber/broker who bought and sold 
shares.   In this respect, the market in 1720 was more subject to personal interactions or 
less anonymous than is the stock market today.  The actual transfer of ownership took 
place when the sale was registered with the relevant company.  Ownership was legally 
defined within the charter of the respective company and entitled an individual 
potentially to vote at the General Court and to elect or be elected to the Board of 
Directors.
13  Share ownership also entitled a person to a stream of dividends and to 
potential capital gains or losses, both of which depended on the economic fortunes of the 
particular company. 
Thanks to the general freedom allowed to printers after the accession of William III to 
the throne of England in 1688, a number of print sources informed current and potential 
investors on developments in the emerging securities market.  Newspapers began 
inserting regular paragraphs to report on the latest prices.  Perhaps even more useful, a 
specialized publication, John Castaing’s Course of the Exchange, began regular 
appearance by at least 1698.
14  Castaing’s publication appeared twice-weekly, on 
Tuesdays and Fridays, coinciding with the days that mail packet boats left from Harwich 
to the Dutch port at Hook of Holland.  Each issue contained the prices of the major 
securities over the previous three days, as well as the latest exchange rates for bills of 
exchange on major European cities.
15  As a result, those living outside London, in 
Amsterdam or further afield, had information about the general state of the markets in  
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London.  One important result of the financial press was that shares were now more 
transparently priced. A person buying or selling had knowledge of the most recent market 
price and thus would have to spend less time searching for price information.  Because 
ownership of a share was well defined and easily transferable, and prices transparent, 
shares were a liquid financial asset.  It was, in fact, the very liquidity of shares that helped 
to generate the South Sea Bubble of 1720. 
In the years following the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the English government grew 
increasingly concerned about the size of its outstanding debt.  The monied companies - 
Bank of England (1694), New East India Company (1698) and the South Sea Company 
(1710) - had already shown that a swap of government debt for company equity could 
reduce the government’s debt service.
16   The initial proposal to undertake a further debt-
for-equity swap came from the directors of the South Sea Company, but the directors of 
the Bank of England quickly entered into competition for this business.  The impact of 
this competition was to increase the size of the loan or the price that each company 
offered the government for the privilege of undertaking this swap.  Ultimately, the South 
Sea Company offer was chosen.  The bare outlines of the agreement were that the 
government would receive a £7.5 million loan from the South Sea Company, while the 
Company would issue roughly £31 million shares of new capital with roughly half to be 
exchanged with existing government debt-holders and the remainder as a new share 
issue.
17  The main implication of this debt for equity exchange for our purposes is that it 
brought the existing holders of government debt in the form of annuities into the already 
flourishing market for equities and the potential for capital gains attracted new 
purchasers.  
  10
  The bubble began in February 1720 with Parliamentary approval of the South Sea 
Company’s plan to redeem outstanding government debt not already held by that 
company, the Bank of England or the East India Company.  The higher the market price 
of South Sea stock the more attractive would be the inducement for debt holders to 
exchange government debt for company stock and also the more attractive for the South 
Sea  Company which would need less stock per unit of debt redeemed.
18  Thus, the 
incentives were set for the directors of the company to focus on the market value of the 
existing stock.  Rather than place all the stock issue on the market at once, the company 
decided to do so in a number of stages or subscriptions.  Such was the enthusiastic 
response by debt holders that, with each successive subscription of new stock, the price 
of South Sea shares rose spectacularly, and with it the share prices of other companies 
also rose.
19 
  Such was the demand for this debt-for-equity swap that the books of the South 
Sea Company had to close from June 23 to August 22, 1720 to allow the clerks to catch 
up on recording all of the subscriptions received.
20  When transfer books reopened in 
August, the opening price was essentially as in mid-June.  Immediately, however, the 
price of its stock began to fall, resulting in a general scramble for liquidity.  In September 
1720, the South Sea Company attempted to enlist the aid of the Bank of England in 
completing the debt conversion but this failed and prices continued to fall ending the year 
essentially where they had begun.
21  Thus in the period during and immediately after the 
Bubble, the Bank of England was an important player in the market.  The rise and fall of 
share prices in 1720 is called the South Sea Bubble.  Bank of England shares started the  
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year at 150, rose to 180 in May and 250 in June, falling back to 147 on the last day of the 
year as shown in Figure 1. 
 
3.  Networks and Social Capital 
The secondary market for shares that had developed by 1720 was anonymous as to 
social status, class, occupation, gender or religion, in that a person from any social class, 
gender, occupation, location (including foreign) or religion could buy or sell a share.
22  
Yet at the same time, the buying or selling of a share was often a face-to-face transaction 
and it is in this aspect that outsiders might have had a more difficult time than insiders 
connected by family, religions, or politics.   The act of buying a share or stock on the 
secondary market also requires some level of information.  The desire to buy a share 
presupposes that the person already has some information about what share purchase 
means and what benefits might accrue.
23  But it also requires knowledge on where to go, 
what to ask for, and what forms to file.  Information of this type is a public good.  One 
shareholder’s knowledge does not impinge on what another shareholder can know.  There 
are two potential and certainly not mutually exclusive sources of information and 
knowledge:  the print media and networks. 
The print media clearly diffused the information necessary for the effective operation 
of securities markets and such sources were widely available by 1720.  Networks provide 
more informal links between people allowing them to reduce the costs of gathering 
information or providing easier access information, though access to such information did 
not always mean that the information was accurate.
24  Networks link individuals to 
information though other individuals.  The importance of networks has been well  
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established in many different areas.  Sociologists are particularly interested in how 
networks operate (Granovetter, 1974, 1985; Burt, 1987, Montgomery, 1990).  Political 
scientists are interested in the ways in which networks affect the transmission of political 
information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, 1994).   
Economists examine the ways in which networks determine the propagation of crisis 
through contagion (Kelly and Ó Gráda, 2000; Schiller and Pound, 1989; Calomiris and 
Mason, 1997).   In each case the authors seek to understand how the network operates 
and the ways in which individuals within the network are connected to one another. 
  By linking people together, networks provide their participants with benefits. At 
the same time, networks reflect both choice on the part of the individuals within the 
network and the social structures in which the individual is embedded.  While an 
individual can choose with whom to spend time and share information, networks are 
partly determined by geography, occupation, social customs, religion and mores which in 
turn constrain the set of choices facing any single individual.  Nonetheless, belonging to a 
network provides a short cut for acquiring information and evaluating the information.  
Networks, thus, are one mechanism through which the social capital of a society 
operates.
25  Networks change the costs of information and as a result of repeated 
interactions they also build trust and reciprocity between members of the network as they 
learn about one another. 
  The extent of the benefits and costs from any given network will vary by network. 
Obviously, networks are not all going to have the same characteristics.  For instance, 
networks can be different sizes.  Burt has argued that bigger networks are better than 
smaller ones because “more contacts can mean more exposure to valuable information,  
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more likely early exposure, and more referrals” (Burt, 1992: 16).  Granovetter examining 
the question of frequency of interaction - where more frequent interaction means stronger 
ties - has focused on the strength of those ties.   Interestingly, he argues that networks 
built on strong ties will quickly exhaust the information in the network, thus pointing to 
the ‘weakness of strong ties’ (Granovetter, 1973 and 1983).   In contrast, networks based 
on weak ties can contain more new information because weak networks expose people to 
more information as they tend to tie diverse groups together.  As a result of these loose 
links, individuals can move beyond what might otherwise be considered a tightly knit 
environment determined by geography or social structures.   
  The Jewish community in London in the early eighteenth century must have 
appeared to outsiders as a strong network defined by ties of kin, business, language and 
dress.  But in reality there were not one but two quite separate communities; comprising 
the quite distinct Sephardic and Ashkenazi groups.  Indeed, by 1700, both groups had 
their own Synagogues.  The Sephardim worshiped at the Bevis Marks Synagogue 
originally located in Creechurch Lane but in 1694 a new synagogue in Plough Yard was 
built “on the condition that it was built away from the highway so as not to arouse any 
offence among the surrounding populations” (Rubens:117).
26  The Ashkenazi Synagogue 
was close by in Duke’s Place in the East End of the City.  Members of both communities 
tended to live in the City of London just beyond the City wall within walking distance of 
the synagogues.  The proximity enhanced by geography would have created stronger ties 
further reinforced by language with the Sephardim speaking Ladino, Portuguese or Dutch 
and German or Yiddish for the Ashkenazi community.  At the same time, these Sephardic 
and Ashkenazi communities were not monolithic.  There were splits and divisions within  
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each.
27   
  The ties that bound the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities were of course the 
very ties that separated them from one another and from the larger London communities.  
Language, religion, dress and the use of one’s own shops and shopkeepers reduced the 
number of interactions between Jews and everyone else and more readily defined Jews as 
outsiders.  Clearly, the non-Jewish community was not homogeneous either being 
comprised of separate but interlocking groups.  These groups did however speak a 
common language defined more broadly by kin, business, politics and religion.  These 
overlapping circles created social capital generating bonds of trust and reciprocity 
between and across these different circles.  These overlapping circles, therefore, created 
bonding and bridging social capital, to use the terminology of Woolcock, encompassing 
these ties between family, neighbors and work (2001:13-14).  The majority of London 
Jews would not at this time have had access to these two particular forms of social 
capital, although there are instances of marriage between Jew and Gentile. Woolcock, 
however, also defines linking social capital as that which allows connections between 
groups who are dissimilar and thus creating the weak networks of Granovetter.   
By 1720, coffee shops had become a focal point of activity for the burgeoning 
stock market and so a location for the emergence of bridging social capital.  As focal 
points, Jonathan’s and Garraway’s coffee houses in Exchange Alley (shown in Figure 2)  
reduced the cost of information gathering and made it more convenient for buyers and 
sellers to locate counterparties and also to find a broker.  But for the more observant 
members of the Jewish community, these coffee houses themselves were problematic.  It 
was not that observant Jews did not drink coffee.  We know there were coffee houses in  
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the Jewish ghettos of Venice and Verona.  Indeed, in response to a question in the 
sixteenth century about coffee and coffee houses,  Rabbi David ibn Abi Zimra (d. 1573) 
wrote that he saw no problem with the beverage being prepared by a non-Jew, both 
because separate utensils were used for coffee and because it was too insubstantial an 
item to fall under the prohibition of bushulei nokhrim.  Coffeehouses were another matter 
entirely, prompting him to state: 
…, I do not consent to its being drunk at a meeting place of non-Jews, for this has 
some undesirable consequences and the Jews are holy ... (Horowitz:22)   
Not all Jews in London were observant.  But an inability to access information and 
counterparties at a coffee house would further reduce ties between the minority and 
majority groups.   
Language, religious observance, diet, dress and language or an overall lack of 
bonding, bridging and linking social capital all suggest that Jews should not be heavily 
involved in the secondary market for shares in London.  They were very clearly outsiders.  
Yet historical and contemporary descriptions of London Jewry state that members of this 
community were major players in the capital market as stock jobbers and brokers.  This is 
made most clear in the anti-Semitic rhetoric that followed the Jewish Naturalization Bill 
of 1753: 
They deal largely in the Mysteries and Iniquities of Stock-jobbing, and get vast 
Estates by plundering the Publick .... They are all griping Usurers ....It can never 
be to our temporal Interest to see such Persons made Englishmen, and I am 
certain it can never be the Interest of our Religion. (Cranfield:21) 
According to ‘Britannicus’, a pen name for one of the more forceful writers for  
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London Evening-Post, rich Jews did not engage in trade which was so vital for England’s 
survival, but rather made their money in “’Stock Jobbs, Lotteries, and other iniquitous 
Arts of Exchange Alley’” (Cranfield:21).  The London Evening-Post was more concerned 
with inflammatory rhetoric than facts.
28  Yet if the local population believed that the Jews 
were a “knavish people, who will over-reach and cheat you if they can” ... “so dextrous in 
bargaining that it is impossible for Christians to expect any advantage in their dealings 
with them” (Endelman, Georgian England:98),  it is difficult to see how any member of 
either the Sephardic or Ashkenazi community could act as brokers for the larger non-
Jewish community.  How networked and how integrated the Jewish community was in 
the 1720 London capital market is fundamentally a question of measurement, to which 
we now turn.  
 
4.  Bank of England stock and its Jewish Shareholders  
  Joint-stock companies kept exceptionally good records of who owned their stock.  
They did so for two important reasons.  The first was that they had to know to whom to 
pay dividends.  The second was that the boards of directors were elected.  Eligibility to 
vote or to sit on the board of directors (Court of Assistants) required ownership of 
different numbers of shares.  Because these companies had to know how many shares an 
individual owned, transfers of shares were recorded.  Here we focus on transactions in the 
Bank of England shares which by 1720 were the blue-chip stock in the market.
29  The 
transfer ledgers (AC28/1545-1554) note the name, address, occupation or social status, 
date, and book value of the transfer, for every seller and buyer of Bank of England stock.  
These records, thus, give us an accurate picture of the spot market for Bank stock.  The  
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records do not tell us about the forward market nor do they tell us the exact price at which 
the transaction took place.  However, from the financial press we know the daily listed 
price.  
  We use name as the leading indicator for whether someone was Jewish.  Given 
the recency of their arrival in London, members of the Sephardic community are 
relatively straightforward to determine - Pereira, da Costa, Nunes, Fernandez, Peixota, 
Macado, for example.   Members of the Ashkenazim from Eastern Europe such as Moses 
Hart and Isaac Levy are perhaps less readily identifiable.   We have therefore coded all 
male individuals with biblical first names - Moses, Abraham, Isaac, Solomon - as Jewish.  
This, of course, is going to be an upper bound estimate in that some individuals were 
baptized Catholics or Anglicans or were Dissenters.
30  But this very broad brush provides 
us with an outside estimate of the Jewish market network.  
  Over 1720, the book value of transfers of the Bank of England stock was £6.2 
million.
31  With a book value of capital stock at £5.5 million and recognizing that not all 
who owned stock sold during the 1720, the volume of activity in the market for Bank of 
England stock is very large.  There were 7,275 transactions of Bank stock 3,872 
individuals: either as buyer, as seller, or as buyer and seller.
32  The vast majority of these 
individuals were in the market only once, as either a buyer or seller.  Of these almost 
4,000 unique individuals, we have only 166 persons whom we can define as Jewish.
33 
This is 4.3% of all unique individuals.  In contrast, there were 594 unique women who 
were active in the market, only 4 of whom were Jewish.
34  Of these, 166 individuals, 93 
both bought and sold shares; the other 73 were either only buyers or only sellers.  Thus in 
terms of just the number of investors, London’s Jews were a small fraction of the market  
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in Bank stock.  
  Of course, the number of unique individuals is only one measure of market 
penetration because a single individual could have many different transactions. By our 
estimate, Jews were involved in 656 sale transactions and 824 purchase transactions for a 
total of 1480 transactions of which only 166 were between two Jews.  So the majority of 
transactions were between the Jewish and Gentile stockholders.   Jews were the sellers in 
9% of sale transactions, and purchaser in 11% of all purchase transactions, meaning that 
Jews were involved in roughly 20% of total transactions in Bank.  Despite the prevailing 
stereotypes and fears, a Jew was on one side of one fifth of all transactions in Bank of 
England stock across 1720.  
Jews, thus, comprised only 4% of the individuals in the market for Bank stock but 
were involved in 20 % of transfers with most being involved in only one or two 
transactions as with the population at large.  When we consider the value of this activity, 
we find that the book value of sales was ₤512,949 or 8% of the total book value of 
transfers; book value of stock purchases was ₤669,882 or11% of the value of purchases.  
Jews were, therefore, net purchasers of Bank stock which we discuss further below.   The 
average book value of transfers by Jews, whether buying or selling, was significantly 
larger than the average sale or purchase for the market as a whole: ₤3,090 for sales and 
₤4,035 for purchases relative to ₤871 per capita for the whole market (Carlos and Neal: 
507).
35   
  As shown in Figure 1, price changes in Bank stock were not uniformly spread 
across 1720.  Prices start to rise in April and May reaching their zenith in July.  August 
and September see falling prices and by the end of the year, prices were where they were  
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in January.  The monthly pattern of sales and purchases by Jews is shown in Tables 1a 
and 1b.  Given our concern that Abraham Craiesteyn might not be Jewish, we show 
monthly sales and purchases including and excluding Craiesteyn.  While the numbers 
change slightly, the main results carry through in all cases.  In the first six months of the 
year, Jewish shareholders were involved in less than 10% of sale transactions by month.  
Their sale activity rose in the next six months reaching 18% and 15% of all transactions 
in November and December, respectively.  As buyers, Jews again comprised less than 
10% of purchasers in the first six months of 1720.  However, they became especially 
important as a group after the down turn of the Bubble.  Jews were involved in 12% of 
purchases in July but as much as 29% in August and 21% in September.  Purchases then 
fell back to roughly 11% to 14% of monthly activity for the last three months of the year.  
The distribution of activity by book value shows the same pattern.  In August, London 
Jewry purchased £146,714 book value of stock or 26.5% of the total book value of stock 
purchased in that month.  Thus, just as the price of South Sea stock was plummeting in 
August and September and the resulting scramble for liquidity was driving down the 
price of Bank of England stock, Jewish purchases helped stabilize the price of Bank stock 
and slow its decline, while as net purchasers they increased their representation among 
the stockholders eligible to vote in the annual general meetings. 
  This increased representation of Jews in the market for Bank of England stock is 
striking.  The book value of Bank shares purchased in August 1720 was almost three 
times the book value in the previous month.  Non-Jews in the market were clearly willing 
to sell to members of the Jewish community whatever their own personal perception of 
that community might have been.  Social network analysis allows us to look at the pattern  
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of activity more spatially and to better understand how people were related to one another 
within the market for Bank stock.
36  Each transfer links an individual seller with an 
individual buyer.   Each such pair of agents and the tie between them is called a dyad in 
network analysis.  For any two separate individuals in the market for Bank stock this 
dyad can take one of four different forms: no connection between two given traders (0,0); 
trader 1 buys from trader 2 but not the reverse (1,0); trader 1 sells to trader 2 but not 
reverse (0,1); and trader 1 buys from and sells to trader 2 (1,1).  While the relationship 
between individuals in Bank stock is not necessarily symmetric, it is directed in that 
someone who wants to buy has to find someone who wants to sell.    
  In this framework, we can measure the links between individuals via a set of 
network metrics.  Density refers to the number of actual links in the network compared 
with the number of possible links.  For example, if g defines the number of nodes or 
actual agents, then g(g-1)/2 represents the maximum number of lines in the network 
graph.  For example if g=5, then the maximum number of possible connections between 







Of course, the actual number of links between these five agents could be zero.  So if L 
represents the number of actual links between agents, density is measured as 2L/g(g-1) or 
the number of actual links relative to all possible links.  As the number of possible ties 
increases exponentially with the number of agents, the density measure decreases with 
the size of the network and so it will be very small when there are a very large number of 
possible linkages. Distance measures the shortest path between any two agents, ni and nj, 
such that d(i,j) = d(j,i).  Essentially, these two measures give us a summary of the how 
agents are related within the market. In the schematic given above the distance is one link 
from any agent to another.  Reflecting the large size of our network, the density measure 
for the whole market for Bank of England shares is very low at 0.0005.















low density coefficient, all pairs of traders are loosely connected in this market through 
the movement of stock, in that A sells to B who then sells to C.
38  For Bank of England 
shares in 1720, the average distance between agents was 4.593.  One can think of this as 
the degree of separation between traders and implies that on average any two traders in 
the network were connected through only three to four other traders 
As we noted above, London Jewry comprise a very small part of this very loosely 
connected market.  But they are part of this market.  If we only consider all transactions 
that involve a Jew and calculate density and average distance on this reduced network, 
density increases to 0.0011 as expected.  The average distance between reachable pairs is 
now 3.16.  However, not all actors were equally involved in the market.  Indeed, as we 
noted earlier nearly 80% of all, Jew or non-Jew, who bought or sold Bank of England 
stock had at most two transactions (Carlos and Neal: 511).  Although this pattern also 
held for the Jewish community, proportionally more Jews were involved in more than 
two transactions.  For instance, roughly 9% of all Jewish traders were involved in ten or 
more transactions, whereas for all involved in Bank stock, the proportion is roughly 4%.    
The most important Jewish traders in Bank stock were Francis (Aaron) Pereira 
who had 62 sales and 109 purchases and Moses Hart with 31 sales and 41 purchases. 
Francis Pereira was Sephardic, while Hart was Ashkenazi.  Both were central players in 
the market for Bank stock. The centrality of an individual describes how an individual 
actor is situated within the larger market.  Degree Centrality, for instance, is measured 
along two directions: out degree, which in our case relates to the number of sales, and in 
degree which measures number of purchases.
39   As is evident from the number and size 
of his transactions in the Bank transfer ledgers, Francis Pereira has the highest level of  
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centrality, followed by Moses Hart.
40  More importantly, however, measured across all 
agents and transactions, Pereira ranks eleventh and Hart twelfth in terms of out degree 
(sales), and fifth and thirteenth, respectively, in terms of in degree (purchases).  Both men 
were broker/jobbers standing ready to buy and sell from any wishing to sell or buy, which 
argues for a degree of connectedness with the market as a whole and for a willingness by 
non-Jews to interact with both Pereira and Hart. 
If degree centrality refers to the number of transfers carried out by an agent, 
betweenness centrality describes who was most central within the flow of transfers such 
that the agent acted as a node for transfers between others.   By this measure, Francis 
Pereira ranks fourth in the whole market behind Sir George Caswall, Robert Westley (a 
merchant tailor) and James Martin (goldsmith).  Moses Hart lies seventh.  It does not 
appear that the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities in London were closely connected 
even in terms of their common interest in the active securities trade that had arisen in 
1720.  Of his 62 sales, Francis Pereira, the wealthiest Sephardi in terms of Bank stock, 
had only one sale to Moses Hart, a member of the dominant Ashkenazi congregation, and 
Hart had only one sale to Pereira.  This possibly more than any other number points to the 
separation within London Jewry even if they were seen by outsiders as one.  Indeed, in 
the ranking of the top fifteen agents in terms of betweenness centrality measures, there 
are two other members of the Sephardic community: Anthony da Costa and Solomon 
Pereira, and also Abraham Craiesteyn who perhaps was not Jewish but was tightly 
connected with the community in Amsterdam. 
This  betweenness centrality is measured across all of 1720.  However, the 
centrality of Pereira and Hart changed quite dramatically over the course of the Bubble.    
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In January, Francis Pereira had only two sales: to Anne Saville and Joseph da Costa, 
while Moses Hart had no transactions.  Schematically for Pereira, these are the equivalent 
of two rays from a node (such as lines 1 and 5 from node A in prior schematic).   In 
March, Pereira again had only two transactions: buying from Sarah Maria Trip (wife of a 
leading Amsterdam merchant) and selling to John Furly.  By June, Pereira was buying 
from and selling to more people. A diagrammatic representation of his June activity is 
given in Figure 3 with the arrows showing the direction of flow of shares.  Despite the 
larger number of transactions, only one took place with another Jew, Ferdinand Mendes.  
However, four of his seven purchases were from sellers living in Amsterdam.  Pereira 
had one transaction of £3,000 with Michael Court of Amsterdam.  One of his other 
transactions was from a fellow broker, Johanna Cock, who was also connected with the 
Dutch community.
41  His mercantile and family connections to the Amsterdam 
community would have been strong and in his will, he left money to the Synagogue in 
Amsterdam.
42  In addition his daughter married and lived in that city. 
By August, Pereira had become a major player in the market, with ten sale 
transactions and 43 purchases.  Indeed, he may have been the most important figure in 
the market in this month.  Figure 4 shows a much more complex and dynamic situation 
than any month earlier.  Relative to the hub and spoke pattern of July, August is much 
more complex with interactions between sets of individuals revolving around Pereira.   
Even though Pereira has only ten sales in August, seven were to other members of the 
Sephardic community and with an extremely large sale of £6,000 to Peter Delmé, another 
major broker of Bank stock.
43  His purchase pattern is much more diffuse: six came from 
Amsterdam and four from other Jews, including one from Moses Hart, but most of his  
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other purchases were from individuals who themselves involved in large numbers of 
transactions and so might be considered in the middle levels of those active in Bank 
stock. Unlike Westley, whom we discuss below, Pereira is not buying from the small 
seller.  By October, the number of his transactions has fallen to only eight for the month 
and he ends the year as a net purchaser of Bank of England of over £50,000 book value 
of stock.  Francis Pereira ended the year holding £93,105 book value of stock and 
continued to be a major shareholder in Bank stock during the 1720s.  
  Our centrality measures have Moses Hart as a central player in the market. 
However, he is important in only a few months.  Whereas Pereira was involved in 171 
transactions, Hart was involved in only 72.  And while Pereira was in the market in 
January, Hart did not have his first transaction in Bank stock in 1720 until May when he 
sold £500 book value of stock to John Fermor, an Army Colonel.  In June seen in Figure 
5, Hart was involved in a larger number of transactions, but as with Pereira, six of his 
nine purchases are from sellers living in Amsterdam and three of his sales are to Jews 
and, three sales on different dates to George Caswall, one of the top two brokers in Bank 
stock.  So again in the London market, Hart interacted at the top levels of the financial 
community.  But even this level of activity did not continue.  In contrast to Pereira, his 
August transactions were less complex (Figure 7) and he ended the year with a zero net 
position in Bank of England stock over 1720, confirming his official role as a broker, not 
a jobber.  
 
5. Analysis  
  Francis Pereira and Moses Hart were important players in the market for Bank of  
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England stock in 1720, but they are not the largest players.  The two most important 
broker/jobbers in Bank of England stock were Sir George Caswall and Robert Westley, 
who had the highest centrality measures.  During 1720, Sir George Caswall had 214 
purchases and 240 sales of Bank stock; Robert Westley had 199 and 254.  Caswall and 
Westley came from very different strata of London society.  Caswall was a knight and a 
member of the elite, while Westely was a merchant tailor.  By and large Westley bought 
and sold from those further down the social ladder: shopkeepers, textile workers and 
smaller merchants.  The difference in their clientele can be seen in the book value of 
transactions. Despite having roughly the same number of purchases, the book value of 
Westley’s purchases for 1720 was £105,556 while for Pereira it was three times larger at 
£336,197.     
Caswall and Westley operated in different parts of the market.  Where Caswall 
had six sales over £10,000 book value with the largest being a sale of £30,000 to Samuel 
Strode who is listed as a stationer and his smallest book value sale at £200, Westely had 
26 sales with a book value less than £100 with one at £3; his largest was £4,800 to an 
army colonel, Charles Matthew.  The segmentation of the market by income or social 
class is also visible in that none of Westely’s 254 sales were to members of London’s 
Jewry, even to Pereira, Hart, da Costa, Levy or Medina.  He did have one purchase of 
£700 from Solomon Medina on 3
rd November 1720.  In contrast, Pereira both bought 
from and sold to Hart and Pereira.  Figures 7 and 8 describe the June transactions for both 
men.   Another feature of Westley’s transactions in June’s 41 sales was that few were 
outside of London and none with shareholders in Amsterdam.  Pereira, by contrast, was 
clearly engaged with Amsterdam’s merchant community, both Jewish and non-Jewish.    
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 Despite the overall importance of Caswall and Westley for dealing in Bank stock 
during 1720, Francis Pereira and other members of the Jewish community were the 
critical players in August, when the Bubble began to break.  In 43 purchases, Pereira 
bought £39,000 of Bank stock.  He laid off £20,000 in the ten separate transactions 
described above; six of which were to other members of the Sephardic community: 
Jacob, Abraham, and John da Costa; Jacob Henriques, Lewis Mendes and Francisco 
Duarte in Amsterdam. He also had a £6000 sale to Peter Delmé another top broker/jobber 
in Bank stock who was also dealing regularly with the Amsterdam merchant elite. 
 
August was a critical month for the financial sector.  It saw the downturn in share 
prices and the beginning of the end of the Bubble.  In essence, the Sephardic community 
stepped in to act in the role of modern central bankers helping to slow down the fall in 
prices and perhaps to provide a much softer landing for this Bubble, at least for Bank 
stock.  Without the actions of Jewish shareholders in the market in August and 
September, prices for Bank stock would have fallen far faster than they did.   Pereira’s 
role in August is evident in the pattern of his sales and purchases and in the network 
graph of his position in the market.  But hidden within these data and graphs is the fact 
that Pereira may also have been stepping into the market to replace Sir George Caswall, 
who as a director of the South Sea Company, was spending some months in the Tower of 
London.  From being the most important broker for Bank of England stock, Caswall had 
just two transactions in August.  And Robert Westley had only 12 purchases.  Indeed, 
Westley probably did not have the financial resources to buy £39,000 book value in one 
month as did Pereira. A counterfactual world where there had been no change other than  
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Caswall’s removal might have been one in which the market responded with a much 
faster decrease in price.  In such an event it is not impossible to conceive that there might 
have been significantly more disruption within the financial and mercantile communities 
as prices fell more precipitously and with that the value of collateral with the financial 
community also plummeting. 
There were Jews, mainly Sephardic but some Ashkenazi, embedded in the 
secondary market for Bank stock.  If we think of the market as a pyramid from large 
brokers at the top down to the incidental or small traders at the bottom, or as sets of 
concentric circles with the large broker/jobbers in the center, and smaller broker/jobbers 
farther out, Jews entered into contact with the market both at the top or in the center, and 
from a periphery.  Patterns of purchases show a much closer connection to Amsterdam 
than to London.  Jews were using their social capital to link friends and family and 
community in Amsterdam to the burgeoning market in London.  Pereira and Hart are 
very much part of an elite financial community connected in London to the other large 
brokers where their financial assets rather than their religion would have been important, 
rather than as part of a more broadly diffused London market.  Hart, for example, was an 
agent for William Law in Paris who was buying South Sea stock.
44  
 
  The pamphlet literature and the public press in mid century played on the idea that 
Jews were a ‘knavish people’; dishonest and unscrupulous, ready to cheat others in order 
to make money.  Their activities across the South Sea Bubble allows us to look more 
closely at this ascertain.  Bubble periods are ones in which people have the opportunity to 
make speculative gains or losses.  Our previous work estimated aggregate gains or losses  
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for all involved in the market for Bank of England stock across 1720. It showed that, on 
aggregate, the almost 4000 individuals had a net loss of -£7 per head (Carlos and 
Neal:516-517).  However, the gains and losses were unevenly distributed.  Men on 
average lost -£14 per head, while women made £25 per head.
45  When we consider how 
the Jewish community fared, we find that as a group they experienced serious financial 
losses as a result of their activities in the market for Bank of England stock.  As a result 
of their transactions, Jews in the market ended the year as overall net purchasers of Bank 
of England shares.  These shares cost them £360,000 or £2,169 per head.  Valuing the 
shares at 147, the price on December 30 1720, Jews in the market had speculative losses 
of -£780 per person.  They had purchased shares when the market price was high and by 
the end of the year the price had fallen.   Thus far from being a knavish people who were 
“so dextrous in bargaining that it is impossible for Christians to expect any advantage in 
their dealings with them”, London’s Jewish investors in Bank of England stock lost 
heavily during the Bubble. 
There is no question that the Sephardic community used its financial capital to 
smooth the downturn in the market for Bank of England stock.  Whether this was done 
deliberately or accidentally is something that we currently do not know.   On the one 
hand, it is perhaps easy to think that perhaps this was a ‘price of admission’ for greater 
access and acceptance.  Endelman (2002:66) has argued that intensive social interaction 
between Jews and non-Jews took place at top and bottom of the social ladder.  For 
instance, he gives the example of Samson Gideon who married a Protestant, baptized his 
children and whose daughter married the second Viscount Gage with a dowry of £40,000 
and obtained a baronetcy for his son.  Certainly, the da Costas and the Pereiras along with  
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other Sephardic families bought country estates in Surrey and Stanmore.
46 Yet 
assimilation probably took place on a family by family basis.  When Anthony da Costa 
applied for admission to the Russia Company seven years after the South Sea Bubble, he 
was refused.  Even when the Attorney General took his part, he still was not admitted. 
(Endelman, 1979:23)   
Perhaps more compelling is to argue that the memory of financial panics in 
Amsterdam in the 1680s and earlier in the century in Vienna made London’s Sephardic 
community especially aware of the consequences of a collapse of the financial system 
which would have brought bankruptcies and panic not just within the financial sector but 
also to other closely connected sectors.  Bankruptcies or collapse in the financial market 
would have quickly spread to the mercantile and international trading sectors.  It is 
perhaps not unreasonable to think that London’s Jews were protecting their own large 




Table 1A - Number of Transactions by Sale and Purchase 

















by Jews (%) 
January  325  12 (8)  3.69 (2.46)  19 (18)  5.85 (5.54) 
February  821  50 (46)  6.09 (5.60)  48 (43)  5.85 (5.24) 
March
2  289  14 (11)  4.84 (3.80)  25 (20)  8.65 (6.92) 
April  775  26 (22)  3.35 (2.84)  44 (38)  5.68 (4.90) 
May  1131  90 (73)  7.76 (6.45)  96 (96)  8.45 (8.45) 
June  937  93 (80)  9.93 (8.54)  76 (75)  8.11 (8.00) 
July  507  59 (55)  11.63 (10.85)  62 (57)  12.22 (11.24)
August  698  55 (45)  7.88 (6.45)  203 (195)  29.08 (27.94)
September  416  53 (49)  12.74 (11.79)  88 (85)  21.15 (20.43)
October  411  47 (46)  11.44 (11.19)  45 (40)  10.95 (9.73) 
November  536 94  (92)  17.54 (17.16)  58 (46)  10.82 (8.58) 
December  429  63 (58)   14.68 (13.52)  60 (55)  13.99 (12.82)
Totals  7275  656 (585)    824 (768)   
 
Table 1B - Book Value of Transfers by Sale and Purchase 
  
Book Value of 









Book Value of 
Shares Purchased 




Jews(%)   
January  10,750  (5,750)      2.81 (1.50)  382,007 14,650  (14,150)  3.84  (3.70)
February  78,400  (73,900)   7.99 (7.52) 981,533 68,700  (64,700)  7.00  (6.82)
March  13,500  (10,500)  4.48 (3.48) 301,632 23,800  (18,800)  7.89  (6.23)
April  21,600  (18,600)  3.15 (2.72)  685,122 36,750  (32,050)  5.36  (4.68)
May  80,109  (60,609)  8.34 (6.31) 961,023 78,590  (78,590)  8.18  (8.18)
June  68,806  (61,206)  10.21(9.08) 673,948 62,347  (61,347)  9.25  (9.10)
July  31,429  (28,429)  8.17 (7.39) 384,547 57,000  (53,200)  14.82 (13.83)
August  30,994  (25,494)  5.59 (4.60) 554,227 146,714 (138,514)  26.47 (25.00)
September  33,979  (29,479)  10.43 (9.05) 325,672 65,129  (63,129)  20.00 (19.38)
October  36,100  (35,100)  9.94 (9.67) 363,051 34,200  (30,300)  9.42  (8.35)
November  65,432  (63,932)  18.56 (18.13) 352,524 42,277 (35,027)  11.99  (9.94)
December  41,850  (35,850)  14.63 (12.53) 286,083 39,725  (36,725)  13.89 (12.84)
Totals  512,949(448,849)  8.21 (7.18) 6,251,369 669,882 (626,538)  10.72 (10.02)
 
                                                 
1 The number in brackets refers to the total without Abraham Craiesteyn throughout the tables. 
2 The transfer books were closed for two weeks in March for the semi-annual dividends.  
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Figure 8:  June Transactions of Robert Westley 
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1 Quoted in Endelman, Georgian England: 98.  
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2 We are using the term broker to mean someone who stands ready to buy or sell.  We are not using it to 
mean a legal broker which was defined by law and limited in number. 
3 There is both an extensive literature in history on networks generated by kinship, religion and politics and 
a correspondingly large, albeit separate, literature on the impact of kinship, religion and politics on social 
capital. 
4 For a broader discussion of the role of brokers in the Bank of England stock, see Carlos, Neal and 
Wandschneider, working paper, 2007. 
5 Much of the discussion that follows comes from Endelman, The Jews of Britain. 
6 Some had settled in London in the sixteenth century but all Portuguese had been expelled at the end of the 
century, some having been accused of being Judaizers. 
7 Based on rabbinic theory derived from Ezekiel 4:6 (Healey:75) taking a day to represent a year, the 
mathematically inclined estimated that the millennium would occur in 1655 or 1656.   
8 In addition there were petitions such as Manuel Marinez Dormido, a Spanish merchant, who asked 
Cromwell to allow Jews to be “dwellers here [England] with the same equalness and conveniences which 
your island born subjects do enjoy.” He also asked that Cromwell petition the Portuguese crown to restore 
his fortune (Endelman 2002:23). 
9 See Endelman (2002) for a more complete description of these attempts at expulsion. 
10 But by the end of the seventeenth century not all Jews were foreigners.  Anyone borne in England was 
English.  Thus by birth, members of the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities were English and thus were 
able to buy and own property, although as Jews they could be expelled.   In 1667,  the Court of the King’s 
Bench ruled that Jews could give evidence in court allowing them to swear on the Hebrew Bible and in 
1684, Jews were allowed to sue for recovery of debts owed to them (Endelman 2002:36).    
11 Historians have argued that Jews were excluded from chartered trading companies, see Endelman 
2002:36, such as the Russia or Levant companies.  Both of these companies were organized in the mid-
sixteenth century.  Indeed, the Levant was not a joint-stock trading company but rather regulated company. 
Regulated companies are more akin to clubs which admit members selectively than to companies whose 
stock trades independently on a secondary market. 
12 Jonathan’s became the physical site of the London stock exchange. 
13 The book value of a single share was ₤100.  Most companies required ownership of some number of 
shares to vote and even more to be elected to higher office.  The actual value of a share was determined by 
the market and could be above or below par. A share could be subdivided and so a person could own one-
tenth of a share, for example.  See Scott Constitution and Finance for a discussion of individual charters 
and voting rules. 
14 In competition to Castaing was Freke’s The Price of the Several Stocks which ran from March 1714 to 
June 1722.     
15 It also included notes on the days of dividend payment for the major government stocks and the numbers 
on tallies that were currently being paid off by the Exchequer. 
16 See Neal, Rise of Financial Capital, ch. 2 for a more extensive discussion of the development of this 
information network. 
17 Dickson, Financial Revolution, ch. 5.  These amounts are all in 1720 pounds.  See www.eh.net, How 
much is that? for the current equivalent. 
18 The contract drawn up between the Government and the South Sea company did not specify the actual 
price at which government debt would be exchanged for SSC shares which created the incentive to increase 
the market price.  
19 Those companies competing for investors’ favor against the booming South Sea Company started to take 
defensive measures.  A standard response was to mortgage back a portion of outstanding capital stock, 
reducing the number of shares available for trade on the stock market, while at the same time providing 
relatively cheap credit to their stockholders.  This credit could be used to purchase stock in any company or 
for financial settlement purposes.  Starting May 10, 1720, the Bank of England, most threatened by the 
probable success of the South Sea Company, mortgaged 29% of its capital stock. The East India Company 
and the Royal African Company followed suit 
20 The price quoted for South Sea Company stock during this period was, therefore, a forward price, adding 
a forward premium of the current market rate of interest to the expected future spot price at the end of  
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August.  The transfer books for the other companies remained open.  This means that the actions of these 
stockholders during this period of intense reassessment of the market can be observed. 
21 This occurred when it became evident that the Company’s banking affiliate, the Sword Blade Company, 
was out of cash.  Resolution of the South Sea affair began with the Bank treaty in 1722, whereby the Bank 
of England took on some outstanding South Sea stock, adding nearly £3.5 million to its own capital stock 
22 See Carlos and Neal, 2006. 
23 This does not always mean that the information is correct.  Some less well informed persons might 
believe that prices can only rise. 
24 See Laurence, “The Emergence of a Private Clientele for Banks” Open University, working paper, 2008. 
25 There is a very large body of literature dealing with social capital.  A brief but good overview of the topic 
is to be found in Smith “Social Capital”.  
26 Rubens notes in footnote (117:fn. 4) that the same restriction had also been placed on a Catholic church 
even as late as the mid-twentieth century. 
27 See for instance, Goldish, “Jews, Christians and Conversos: Rabbi Solomon Aailion’s Stuggles in the 
Portuguese Community of London”. 
28 Indeed, all of the slanders refuted in Menasseh ben Israel’s The Humble Address of 1655 were once again 
asserted as fact.  These included usury, cheating, and ritual murder. Cranfield, “The ‘London Evening-
Post’’’. 
29 Looking at women as a separate subgroup, Carlos, Maguire and Neal, analyzed share ownership for 
women in Bank of England (a blue-chip stock) and Royal African (junk status) stocks over 1720.   
30 The majority of those so identified as Jewish are very small participants in the market. There is one 
exception, Abraham Craiesteyn.  Craiesteyn was one of the top ten buyers and sellers of Bank of England 
stock.  To the extent that he was not Jewish, and we think he probably was not, we will be misattributing 
his activities.  In all following tables, we provide estimates with and without Craiesteyn.  There is little 
change in the results. 
31 £1 in 1720 is roughly equivalent to £123 in 2005. www.eh.net/ How Much is That? 
32 The aggregate data for the Bank of England come from Carlos and Neal, “The Microfoundations of the 
Early London Capital Market”. 
33 Without Craiesteyn we have 165 individuals. 
34 While women made up nearly 15% of all individuals in the market, Jewish women made up only 2% of 
the Jews in the market.  These were Rachael Henriques, Arabella Mendes, Deborah Mendes, Ribca Nunes. 
For Jewish women, language would have limited access to the market. 
35 Of course, the variation across individual was very large both within the Jewish community and the 
whole population of those in the market for Bank stock. 
36 Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, eds, Advances in Social Network Analysis. 
37 The standard deviation is high at 0.0218. 
38 There were 328 pairs for whom this was their only transaction.  Each of these 328 pairs only trades 
within the pair and neither side has any further links with the rest of the market.  We do not include these 
agents in the distance analysis. 
39 This analysis was conducted using Borgatti, Everett and Freeman Ucinet 6 for Window. 
40 Craiesteyn also has a high centrality measure.  He ranked five in our betweenness centrality measure. 
41 See Carlos and Neal, 2004, for a more complete discussion of Joanna Cock’s activities. 
42 Pereira did also leave money to the Bevis Mark Synagogue in London and to the Jewish community 
there. 
43 See Carlos, Neal and Wandschneider, 2008 for a discussion of brokers in Bank stock. 
44 Neal, 1994. 
45 The relative losses and gains by gender were found also in the tech bubble of the 1990s. 
46 See Sutcliffe, “Identity and Space”, pp.101-104. 